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NOTES AND COMMENT
"ATTRACTIvE NUISANCE" DOCTRINE IN WISCONSIN-INFANT
TRESPASSERS-It is a general rule that a trespasser takes his chances
and must look out for himself, and that no duty rests upon the owner
of property to keep his property in such condition or so guarded that a
wrongful intermeddler shall not be exposed to danger.' But inasmuch
as children of tender years are less able to forsee and appreciate danger
than are persons of mature years and intelligence it is generally recog-
nized that they are entitled to a greater degree of care than adults.2
Such recognition of the consideration due infant trespassers has led to
the development in recent years3 of the so-called "attractive nuisance"
doctrine, the viewpoint, not endorsed in all jurisdictions,4 that one who
maintains upon his property or in a public place a dangerous instru-
mentality or dangerous condition, of a character likely to attract chil-
dren, with the knowledge that children, motivated by childish impulses
of curiosity and playfulness, are in the habit of resorting thereto, is
liable to a child who is injured thereby. It is an analysis of the applica-
tion of this doctrine in the state of Wisconsin that this summary is
dedicated.
Wisconsin courts, it is submitted, in determining the extent of and
limitations upon the "attractive nuisance" theory have placed consid-
erable emphasis upon the location of the structure complained of, pos-
sibly agreeing that "a thing which might otherwise not attract may
become the source of injury when so situated as to imply to the child-
ish mind the right to make free use of it."5 Thus, in cases where the
condition or structure resulting in injury to one of tender years was
located in a public highway, while the injured infant's status might,
1 20 R.C.L. 70
2Judge Cooley: "Children wherever they go must be expected to act upon
childish instincts and impulses and others who are chargeable with a duty of
care and caution toward them must calculate upon this and take precautions
accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything
which would be tempting to them and which they in their immature judgment
might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they
should expect that liberty to be taken." in Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507,
19 N.W. 257
3 Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Reprint 1041; Sioux City & P. R. Co.
v. Stout, 17 Wall 657, 21 U.S. (L.Ed.) 745; Union P. R. Co. v. 'acDonald,
152 U.S. 262; 38 U.S. (L.Ed.) 434
4 Eastern industrial commonwealths, such as Maine, Connecticut, Vermont,
Mlassachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, among others,
seem to quite uniformly reject the "attractive nuisance" doctrine
5 20 R.C.L. 84
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at least technically, be that of a trespasser,' the courts recognize that
although such public streets are primarily dedicated to the purposes
of public travel, children are accustomed to use them for the purposes
of play.7
Possibly upon this theory recovery has been granted where an in-
fant was injured by the collapse of an unshored ditch located in a pub-
lic street where small children had been seen playing about the ditch.
Ptak v. Kuetemeyer, 182 Wis. 357, 196 N.W. 855; or where a nine
year old girl was killed by falling into an unguarded posthole located
in a street where children were likely to be passing. Secard v. Rhine-
lander Lighting Co. 147 Wis. 624, 133 N.W. 45. Recovery was also
granted to an eight year old plaintiff for an injury resulting from play-
ing about a rope and tackle being used to raise sacks of oats from a
wagon standing in an alleyway. Webster v. Corcoran Bros. Co. 156
Wis. 576, 146 N.W. 815; while in an action against a street railway
company for injury to a child alleged to have been caused by failure
to guard against children playing with a rope and pulley by which a
feed wire was being strung in a highway, it was held not to be a suffi-
cient defense that the work was being done in the usual way, that due
care was exercised to avoid interfering with public travel, and that no
accident had previously occurred. Kelly v. Southern Railway Co. 152
Wis. 328, 140 N.W. 60.8
Chief Justice Winslow, in the case of Harris v. Eastern Wisconsin
Railway & Light Co. 152 Wis. 627, 140 N.W. 288, remarked, "It is
settled in this jurisdiction that one who maintains in the public street
an unguarded object of condition likely to attract children to meddle or
play therewith, with the probable result that of causing injuries" to
themselves or others lawfully using the street, is guilty of actionable
negligence, providing such person knows or is chargeable with knowl-
edge of the attractiveness of the object or condition and the conse-
6 Rose v. Habenstreit, 9 Ohio App. 23, 27 Ohio C.A. 564; Wilde v. Ohio Knife
Co., 18 Ohio 373; but see Reynolds v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. 21 F. (2nd)
958
Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530, 9 N.E. 155; Kreiner v. Straubmuller,
30 Pa. Super. Ct. 609; Znidersnich v. Minnesota Utilities Co., 155 Minn. 293,
193 N.W. 449
s But municipal corporation is not liable for injury to child who caught hold
of the chains of a wagon used for street cleaning purposes, since automobiles,
carriages, or dumping wagons while each attractive and dangerous to chil-
dren, and often dangerous to adults, are not nuisances when in legitimate use
in public street. Bruhnke v. LaCrosse, 155 Wis. 485, 50 L.R.A. 1147, 144 N.W.
1100. Attractive nuisances theory held not applicable to moving truck. Routt
v. Look, 180 Wis. 1, 191 N.W. 55; Gamble v. Uncle Sam Oil Co., 100 Kan. 74,
163 Pac. 627
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quent probability of such meddling and resulting injuries."9 citing in
the opinion the case of Busse v. Rogers, 120 Wis. 443, 98 N.W. 219, in
which recovery was had in the case of a five year old plaintiff injured
by falling lumber pile located within the limits of the street and upon
which the plaintiff had been playing. However, although the courts
have held that a street railway company which left a street car stand-
ing in a public street is chargeable with knowledge that it is an allur-
ing object to children and is therefore required to render it inocuous to
probable childish incursion, such company is not bound to anticipate
extraordinary conduct or precocious ingenuity. Kressine v. Janesville
Traction Co. 175 Wis. 192, 184 N.W. 777.
Somewhat greater reluctance to apply the "attractive nuisance"
theory appears where the alluring or attractive object complained of
is maintained upon private property, despite the fact that it may sub-
stantially adjoin a public way. Thus in Zartner v. George, 156 Wis.
131, 145 N.W. 971, where the plaintiff was injured by jumping into a
mortar box containing lime'0 and water covered by two inches of sand,
recovery was denied although the mortar box was but four or five feet
from the sidewalk. The court, speaking through Justice Vinje, refused
to apply the doctrine of "attractice nuisances" to what it termed the
conduct of ordinary business" carried on in a customary manner upon
private property. The validity of applying the doctrine to injuries re-
sulting from electricity the court conceded, 2 thus distinguishing the
9 Where company constructed a plank-covered breakwater, access to which
from the street was unobstructed, and where to the knowledge of company's
agents such planked surface was used as a pathway, company was held liable
for the death of boy who while walking along the breakwater fell through
a not readily observable hole in the planking into a steam and hot water pit.
Brinilson v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 144 Wis. 614, 129 N.WAr.
664; Jackson v. Texas Co., 143 La. 21, 78 So. 137.
10 "Slacked lime is common article of building material in general use among
building contractors. It is frequently left exposed on lots and in public thor-
oughfares at places convenient to building operations. It may be handled with-
out harm. It is only dangerous when put in the eye or in contact with some
tender member." Fitzpatrick v. Donahue Realty Co., 151 Minn. 128, 186 N.V.
141, 36 A.L.R. 21.
"1 Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Fox, 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N.E. 81; Nixon v. Montana
W. & S. W. R. Co., 50 Mont. 9, 145 Pac. 8; Stamford Oil Mill Co. v. Barnes,
103 Tex. 409, 128 S. W. 375; Smalley v. Rio Grande Western R. Co., 34 Utah
423, 98 Pac.. 311.
12Justice Vinje, "The dangers from electrical currents are so great, so obvious
to those familiar with the effects of electricity, that more strict and stringent
rules and broader test of liability should be applied to the safeguarding of
persons from dangers resulting from coming in contact with such currents
than should be applied to better understood and less hazardous risks resulting
from the usual conduct of ordinary business on private premises." Judicial
stringency in regard to deaths resulting to children from leaving within reach
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case from that of Meyer v. Menominee & Marinette Light and Trac-
tion Co. 151 Wis. 279, 138 N.W. 1008, where recovery was granted for
the death of a fourteen year old boy who climbed a twenty-four foot
lumber pile adjacent to a well travelled road and who was killed when
he grasped a sagging electric lighting wire which was poorly insulated.
The contrary holdings under these two sets of facts might be in-
terpreted as aligning Wisconsin with jurisdictions holding that "liabil-
ity bears relation to the character of the thing, whether natural and
common or artificial and uncommon, to the comparative ease or diffi-
culty of preventing the danger without destroying or impairing the
usefulness of the thing 3 and in short to the reasonableness and pro-
priety of the defendant's conduct in view of all surrounding circum-
stances and conditions."1 4 For, although when we go to say what is
attractive to some child, or even to children generally, we enter upon a
wide uncertain field,"5 it seems that the courts are more likely to hold
the owner of premises liable in cases involving dynamite, 6 dynamite
caps," or electricity,ls than they are to find liability in cases involving
of such a child heavily charged electrical wires possibly illustrated by Lomoc
v. Superior Light & Power Co. 147 Wis. 5, 132 N.W. 623; also, Nagle v. Hake,
123 Wis. 256.
"Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 217, 65 Pac. 379; Lewis v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L.
R. C., 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N.E. 23; Bown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93
Pac. 570; Wilson v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co., 66 Kan. 183, 71 Pac. 282;
Grube v. Baltimore, 132 d. 355, 103 Atl. 948; McLendon v. Hampton Cotton
Mills, 109 S. C. 238, 95 S.E. 781; Overholt v. Vieths, 93 Mo. 422, 6 S. W. 74.
14 Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 349, 47 Pac. 598.
I- Uthermohlen v. Bogg's Run Min. Co., 50 W.Va. 467, 40 S.E. 410.
'"Mattson v. Minn. & N. \V. R. Co., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N.V. 443; Nelson v. Mc-
Lellan, 31 Wash. 208, 71 Pac. 747; Olson v. Gill Home Investment Co. 58
\Wash. 151, 108 Pac. 140; Depew v. Kilgore, 117 Okla. 263, 246 Pac. 606.
17 Sandeen v. Tschider 123 C.C.A. 456, 205 Fed. 252; Vills v. City of Cloquet, 119
Minn. 277, 138 N.W. 33; Krachanake v. Acme Mfr. Co., 175 N.C. 435, 95 S.E.
851; Butrick v. Snyder, 236 Mich. 300, 210 NAV. 311.
11 Meyer v. Menominee & Marinette L. & T. Co., supra; Sheffield- Co. v. Mor-
ton, 161 Ala. 153, 49 So. 772; Hayes v. Southern P. Co., 95 S.C. 230; 78 S.E.
956; Hurd v. Phoenix Co., 7 Boyce (Del.) 332, 106 Atl. 286; Stedwell v.
Chicago, 297 111. 486, 130 N.E. 729; Graves v. Interstate Power Co., 189 Iowa
227, 178 N.\V. 376; Temple v. McComb City E. L. & P. Co., 89 Miss. 1, 42 So.
874; Consolidated Electric Co. v. Healy, 65 Kan. 748, 70 Pac. 884.
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ponds,19 canals, 20 coffee grinders, 21 piles of railroad ties, 22 buildings un-
der construction,23 revolving doors, 24 or standing freight cars.2' While
no classification could cover the innumerable types of risk which might
cause injury to an infant trespasser nor indicate other factors which
might cause the court to permit a recovery,26 it might be safe to con-
clude that both the character of the instrumentality27 and its location
are material considerations in determining whether the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine applies. 2S
However, the landowner need take only reasonable precautions ;29
and even a company engaged in transmitting electrical power need not
forsee and provide against injury to an individual climbing a tower to
the height of thirty feet where no one had ever attempted the feat be-
19 Fiel v. City of Racine, 203 Wis. 149, 233 N. W. 611. (at least in absence of
something extraordinary or exceptional in the circumstances to render the
place peculiarly attractive, more so than the mere pond itself) ; Emond v.
Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 63, 149 NAV. 760; Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271,
32 N.W. 223; Thompson v. Ill. C. R. Co., 105 Miss. 636, 63 So. 185; Blotagh v.
Chicago G. W. R. Co, 189 Iowa 1256, 179 N.W. 840.
20 McCabe v. American W. Co. 65 C.C.A. 59, 132 Fed. 1006; Athey v. Tenn. Coal
& R. Co., 191 Ala. 646, 68 So. 154; National Metal Edge Box Co. v. Agostini,
169 C.C.A. 195, 258 Fed. 109; Somerfield v. Land & Power Co., 93 Kan. 762,
145 Pac. 893.
21 Holbrook v. Aldrich, 168 Mass. 16, 46 N.E. 115; Connelly v. Carrig, 244 N. Y.
81, 154 N. E. 828.
22 Great N. R. Co. v. Willard, 171 C.C.A. 564, 258 Fed. 714; 'Miss. K. & T. R. Co.
v. Edwards, 90 Tex. 55, 36 S.WV. 430; Jenkins v. Great XW. R. Co., 1 K.B. 525.
23 \Vitte v. Stifel, 126 Mo. 295, 28 S.W. 891; O'Callaghan v. Commonwealth En-
gineering Co., 247 N. Y. 127, 159 N.E. 884.
24 Harris v. Cowles, 38 Wash. 331, 80 Pac. 537.
2 - Wendorf v. Director General of R. R.'s, 173 Wis. 53, 180 NAV. 128; Smith v.
Hines, 212 Ky. 30, 278 S.W. 142.
26 As in Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co. 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 where plaintiff
who fell into opening above cellarway recovered because protection neither
proper, adequate, or safe.
27 "For extremely detailed classification on basis of type of machinery, structure,
etc., creating risk-see annotatibn 36 A.L.R. 34. An understanding of the de-
cisions is more nearly to be derived from a study of the risks and factors
present in the particular case than on any other basis. The attempts at broad
doctrinal generalizations both for and against responsibility in these cases have
produced many doubtful decisions." Leon Green, "The judicial Process in
Tort Cases," p. 503.
2 Pennington v. Little Pirate Oil & Gas Co., 106 Kan. 569, 189 Pac. 137; Arkan-
sas Valley Trust Co. v. McIlroy, 133 S.V. 816; see Thompson on Negligence,
f 1030.
29 Thompson v. Alexander City Cotton Mills Co., 190 Ala. 184, 67 So. 407; Mc-
Millan v. Bourbon Stock Yards, 179 Ky. 140, 200 S.W. 328; Keffe v. Milwau-
kee St. P. R. Co., 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. Rep. 393; Sexton v. Construction Co.,
108 S. C. 238, 95 S.E. 781.
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fore, although had such injury occurred near the foot of the tower, the
court might have clothed the child at least with the rights of a licensee
and might then have granted recovery. Bonniwell v. Milwaukee Light,
Heat & Traction Co. 174 Wis. 1, 182 N.W. 468.
Finally, as to alleged alluring conditions located wholly upon pri-
vate property, so that when the child encounters the thing or enters the
structure he is not where he has a right to be 3 0 it would seem that the
"attractive nuisance" viewpoint has, at least in Wisconsin, been re-
ceived with rather definite judicial frigidity. In the case of Lewko v.
Chas. A. Krause M1illing Co. 179 Wis. 83, 190 N.W. 924, a child who
fell into an open steam pit located upon defendant's premises was de-
nied recovery despite allegation that children were in the habit or play-
ing on defendant's land to its knowledge. The court, rather completely
ignoring the habitual use of the premises as a playground, in other
jurisdictions held to be controlling,3 ruled such a child to be at most a
mere licensee to whom the owner owed at most no duty save to refrain
from active negligence rendering the premises dangerous,32 a conclusion
to which Justice Crownhart respectfully dissented. 33
30 In accord see United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Van Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 66 U.S.
(L.Ed.) 615, 42 S. C. Rep. 299, holding no liability for death of child in pool
of poisonous water where there was nothing to show that pool was what led
children to the place and where it did not appear children were in habit of
going to place; Rost v. Parker Washington Co., 176 Ill. App. 245; Fincher V.
Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. 143 La. 164, 78 So. 433. Viwepoint sharply criticized
by Francis H. Bohlen, American Law Institute, Explanatory Notes Torts, T.
No. 4, p. 23; also see Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Porter, 170 Ark. 498, 280 S.
W. 12.
M Union L. H. & P. Co. v. Lunsford, 189 Ky. 785, 22 S.W. 741; Lyttle v. Harlan
Town Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345, 180 S.W. 519; Chicago B. & 0. R. Co. v. Kray-
enbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880; Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. v. Green, 158 C.C.
A. 632, 246 Fed. 767; Millum v. Lehigh & W. B. Coal Co., 225 Pa. 214, 73 Atl.
1106; Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 109 Atd. 656; Nashville Lumber Co.
v. Busbee, 100 Ark. 76 139 S.W. 301; Perry v. Tonapah Min. Co. 13 F. (2nd)
865; Dalton v. Phil & R. R. Co., 285 Pa. 209; 131 Atl. 724.
32 Brinilson v. C. & N. XV. R. Co., supra; Muench v. Heinemann, 119 Wis. 441, 96
N. W. 800; Cahill v. Layton, 57 Wis. 600, 16 N. W. 1.
33 Justice Crownhart, dissenting, "Children of four and one-half are incapable
of discretion. Theirs is 'the law of perfect liberty.' They wander at will on
vacant property for play. Every open place in a populous district is an invita-
tion to the children for childish games. They cannot understand the invisible
line of private property, the crossing of which we are asked to hold makes
them outlaws subject to all the pitfalls that a careless and reckless owner may
dig for their undoing. We are asked to carry the principles established by the
feudal barons to protect game from peasant poachers too far. Humanity re-
coils from such a doctrine-a doctrine that legalizes injury and death to help-
less children through the negligence of grown people, with full understand-
ing of the consequences of their acts ... For my part I feel impelled to follow
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The effect of the decision is to render the landowner liable to infant
trespasser only for acts of active negligence or deliberate entrapment.
To this extent the case seems directly contrary to a somewhat
earlier ruling in Herrem v. Konz, 165 Wis. 574, 162 N.W. 654, where
the defendant was held bound to anticipate injury might result to some
child by coming into contact with a rapidly revolving shaft where he
knew children of tender age were in the habit of playing in open
spaces underneath the ground floor of a lumber mill in close proximity
to the revolving shaft. Why one mill owner should be bound to antici-
pate injury from children playing near a revolving shaft, and another
mill owner should not be bound to anticipate injury to children playing
about a pit into which scalding steam was piped is a question referred
to intellects more penetrating than that of the writer's. At any rate,
insofar as the Lewko decision is followed and to the extent that the
solicitude for the rights of landowners shown in a recent case involv-
ing adult trespassers34 is continued it would seem that the Wisconsin
courts, following the tendency in other jurisdictions to limit the scope
of the doctrine,35 have denied the application of the "attractive nui-
sance" doctrine to conditions or structures situated upon private prop-
erty and not adjoining a public way.
ROBERT W. HANSEN
BANKS AND BANKING-INSOLVENCY-REEIVING DEPOSITS. The
case of Schroeder v. State of Wisconsin, 244 N.W. 599, is of especial
importance at this time in view of current deflated values and the nu-
merous bank failures which have occurred. Schroeder was convicted in
the Circuit Court for having accepted deposits in the Franklin State
Bank of Milwaukee in violation of Section 348.19 of the Statutes. This
Statute makes it a criminal offense for an officer of a bank to receive
deposits when he knows or has good reason to know that the bank
is unsafe or insolvent.
When is a bank insolvent? This question is bound to be the primary
issue in any case of this kind. It was answered in Ellis v. State,'138
Wis. 513, 119 U.W. 1110, as follows:
"A bank is insolvent when the cash value of its assets realizable in
a reasonable time, in case of liquidation by the proprietors, as ordinarily
the reasonable doctrine that a person shall take reasonable care to protect
little children anywhere and everywhere."
34 Frederick v. Great Northern Ry. Co. - Wis.-, 241 N.W. 363.
35 Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 557; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ray, 124
Tenn. 16, 134 S.W. 858; Barnhardt v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 89 Wash.
304, 154 Pac. 441; Carr v. Oregon W. R. & N. Co., 123 Ore. 259, 261 Pac. 899;
Lucas v. Hammond, 150 Miss. 369, 116 So. 536.
